Whitehall and the Five Eyes: well, well, well, what 'ave we 'ere!

Written by: (Contributed) on 20 October 2025

Some recent developments centred on Whitehall have cast considerable light upon how governments of the day, and their Cold War associates and counterparts, deal with espionage, while attempting to contain the problem and credibility and the legitimacy of state institutions which they serve.

It was recently reported that two Westminster parliamentary staffers attached to the Conservative Party have had espionage charges against them dropped for seemingly curious reasons; the allegations included two Chinese spies and breaches of the 1911 Official Secrets Act between January, 2022, and February, 2023. (1) The allegations included how one of the spies 'had been commissioned by a Chinese intelligence agent to write 34 reports on matters of political interest to the Chinese Communist Party … ten of which were deemed prejudicial to UK national interest'. (2)

Amid a political and diplomatic flurry of further allegations, a carefully worded official script dealing with the matter noted 'the government would not say in public that China was an enemy of the UK'. (3) Diplomatic protocol would appear the order of the day in such circles. While allegations of an official cover-up reached a crescendo, an official statement from Westminster actually recalled that 'the security services had prepared a dossier of evidence with hundreds of examples and case studies proving China was a threat'. (4)

The developments have lifted a mighty sizeable lid on the dysfunctional nature of Whitehall; while the security services were preparing and submitting their dossier, the Home Office were experiencing problems in an attempt 'to convince other Whitehall departments of the need to designate China a national security threat'. (5) They appear to have experienced considerable difficulty achieving objectives. Did anyone believe them?

The elite nature of the patronage systems operating inside Whitehall have tended to fill sensitive positions with little professional scrutiny; as one occupant of a seat of power retires or moves to a more lucrative career pathway, their replacement inevitably comes from the same chain of patronage. Both class and state power is retained inside elite schools, university departments, the military, secret societies and select dining clubs; identity theft and corruption remain rampant. The Spycatcher, by Peter Wright, provided the classic view of such patronage systems; little has changed in hundreds of years. In fact, the last great shake-up was the English Civil War, 1642-49. It was subsequently reassembled in 1688.

Elite appointments have been shrouded in layers of bureaucratic secrecy for centuries; the issue of competency or suitability for sensitive positions has never been an agenda item for panels at interviews. The positions are filled from patronage systems, come what may.

The fact one of the alleged spies was actually chair of the China Research Group, which had a role in representing M.P.s, 'who were lobbying government to take a tougher stance on Beijing', has revealed a great deal about patronage systems operating inside Whitehall. (6) Nothing would appear to be what is resembles; benchmarks and reliable frameworks of reference to safeguard sensitive information clearly do not exist in that shadowy and spooky world of Whitehall filled with appointees granted secure employment from up yonder.

The predicament facing Whitehall has been a subject in literature and popular culture for a very long time, the clues in such texts are often highly revealing: Living is easy, with eyes closed … Nothing is real ... Strawberry Fields, forever?

The Starmer government in Westminster, desperate to contain the political fall-out, eventually issued a statement intended to clarify the legal decision to not proceed with the spy-case on the basis that, 'in 2023 China had not been designated as a threat to national security … you can't prosecute someone two years later in relation to a designation as a threat to national security'. (7) It met with complete outrage and finger-pointing at those regarded as party to the high-level intrigue. It was noted, for example, that, 'in 2021, the government's integrated review of security and defence said China presented the biggest state-based threat to the UK's economic security. It added that the distinction between economic and national security is increasingly redundant'. (8)

While the political and diplomatic fall-out continued to resound around Whitehall, another related matter on the far side of the world in sleepy New Zealand, came to light.

Revelations that notes taken during a top secret four-day Five Eyes meeting hosted by the Royal Navy's Warfighting Centre in Portsmouth, were found amongst other donated items in a Salvation Army op shop in Wellington caused raised eye-brows and an abrupt 'no comment' from official circles inside the corridors of power. (9)

The four-day Five Eyes meeting took place within a highly secret special unit composed of about 120 personnel, half military and half civilian, whose role is to provide military intelligence assessments, 'fed on a daily basis into operational decisions … at the Navy Command Headquarters'. (10) No electronic devices were allowed in the meeting rooms.

The carefully drafted and neatly worded notes in question, however, were extensive and covered Five Eyes preparations for 'hi-tech wars' with China; it included information about the network planned for 'globally integrated, all-domain, command and control system … capability for counter-PRC operations'. (11) There was no ambiguity; China was the target.

The fact the notes drew specific attention to 'hours of discussion about AI, including Ethical Obligation – automating dangerous tasks, What is the level of acceptability?, and Responsible AI as an enabler, not a constraint', reveal how internal systems inside the Five Eyes have been upgraded. (12) References to regular simulation war-games and military exercises in cyber-space. (13) Computer screens were the real world.

To what extent the upgraded systems incorporated Project Redspice (Resilience, Effects, Defence, SPace, Intelligence, Cyber, Enablers), launched in March, 2022, which, 'has expanded Australian Signals Directorate's remit and facilitated a huge uplift in ASD capability that includes almost doubling the size of the workforce … adding that about 40 per cent of the ASD workforce strength is now stationed outside Canberra – around the country and alongside Five Eyes counterparts', has yet to be established. (14)

It would, however, appear an already close working relationship.

A previous Australian government was responsible for establishing an Australian Warfare Fighting Centre as a counterpart to the UK facilities; it is based at RAAF Williamstown, 30 kms from Newcastle, NSW. (15) Reference to the Five Eyes secret cloud contained in the secret notes taken at the Portsmouth meeting correspond with official media releases from the ASD, which note 'the ASD is developing … a top secret cloud to support Australia's intelligence community'. (16)

There is also an important question arising with the relationship between the Five Eyes and the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy, of which Australia is a major participant. Circles of interest clearly overlap.

Any reference to diplomatic and signals links between US allies, for example, has to take into account revelations in the Snowden disclosures. The Five Eyes also rely upon Echelon networks in collaboration with Israel, Japan, the ROK and Singapore. The latter is 'one of the world's biggest digital telecommunications hubs … it … is a key third party working with Five Eyes intelligence partners'. (17) Throughout the recent Israeli bombing of Gaza the role of Australia has continually been brought into question with their collusion with the IDF. Canberra has responded with diplomatic silence to the allegations of complicity with war-crimes. They do not want to openly divulge the range and capacity of signals facilities.

In conclusion, a trend whereby military and intelligence personnel appear to have taken priority over other counterparts in government to prevent any accountability whatsoever has taken place; they lurk behind bureaucratic procedures and official secrecy. Proposed restrictions on access to documents under Freedom of Information are part of this. In fact, commentary about the secret notes from the Portsmouth meeting have highlighted the problem that 'either defence officials are pursuing plans contrary to their own government's wishes or the government is not being straight with the public'. (18) And Australia is not a casual bystander to these dangerous developments: we need an independent foreign policy!

1. White House anger white hot over UK espionage case fiasco, Australian, 13 October 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Heat on PM over China spy case ruling, The Weekend Australian, 11-12 October 2025.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Secret defence notes pointing to sensitive China preparation left at op shop, Nicky Hager, 9 October 2025.
10. Official Website: Maritime Warfare Centre, Royal Navy, U.K., Portsmouth.
11. Secret defence notes, op.cit., 9 October 2025.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. ASD leads global strike on Russian cyber crooks, Defence Report, Australian, 16 October 2025.
15. Official Website: Australian Warfare Training Centre, Australian Government, Defence.
16. ASD leads global strike, op.cit., 16 October 2025.
17. See: 'Singapore, South Korea', The Sydney Morning Herald, 31 January 2014; and, 'Japan lends it vision', Nikkei, 10 January 2019; and, 'New Snowden leaks', The Brisbane Times, 17 November 2024; and,Echelon, Espionage, Spies and Secrets, Richard M. Bennett, (London, 2002), pp. 89-93.
18. Secret defence notes, op.cit., 9 October 2025.