Greenland: Misusing “intelligence” to justify aggression

Written by: (Contributed) on 18 January 2026

(Source: www.usatoday.com)

Statements from leading European sources have revealed the Trump administration has been relying upon flawed intelligence assessments to justify its claims on Greenland.

The situation has arisen in the context of a changing geo-strategic balance of forces in the wider Arctic region; US preoccupation with Greenland has revealed the limited range and capacity of sensitive regional surveillance systems used by the Pentagon to provide intelligence data for analysis.

The US has seriously misrepresented the situation. In fact, they have weakened their own diplomatic position with their chosen method of operation of diplomatic bravado.

A recent high-level diplomatic statement from the White House that Greenland had serious security problems due to it being 'covered with Russian and Chinese ships', raised an immediate response from several Western European and Scandinavian countries. (1) The US has relied upon sensitive military facilities based near Thule on the southern coastline of Baffin Bay, facing the Davis Strait, for regional intelligence assessments; the Pituffik Space Base has been described as a 'regional hub' for US operations, including the P-Mountain radar and signals base. (2)

While considered extremely sensitive, the US military facilities are a mere shadow of their range and capacity during the previous Cold War. At their height of operations, they had 6000 military personnel stationed in the facilities. Due to technological advances and defence department cut-backs they now only house about 150 personnel. (3)

While technological advances have increased range and capacity of sensitive military equipment, accurate intelligence assessments rely upon personal judgements from reliable data; they also require trusted 'ground human' feet on the ground to back up the spies in the sky. (4) The US facilities in Greenland have been shown to possess serious deficiencies in their most vulnerable areas; that of providing accurate intelligence assessments. The US also experience similar problems, elsewhere. (5)

In fact, European diplomatic sources have revealed that 'the alliance had no intelligence that there was significant activity by Russian or Chinese vessels or submarines around Greenland … it is not correct that there is a lot of activity from Russia or China around Greenland'. (6) European diplomatic sources have clearly been able to access more accurate intelligence reports from localised and reliable sources either from Greenland residents or counterparts elsewhere.

The official US diplomatic position, nevertheless, remains adamant that 'the acquisition of Greenland is a national security priority, citing Russian and Chinese threats'. (7)

It is important to note, however, that the whole Arctic region, in recent years, has undergone a changing balance of forces; joint military co-operation between Russia and China has presented a serious challenge to traditional US hegemony. Due to global warming, furthermore, the vast Arctic region is slowly thawing, exposing 'key natural resources, and the navigation of northern sea-routes. (8)

The US appears not to distinguish between perceived security threats to Greenland and problems emerging in the wider region. It has revealed a serious intelligence problem.

It is generally accepted that both Russia and China retain an active presence in the Arctic region; but that, 'neither claims Greenland'. (9)

European countries have accepted the need for greater diplomatic attention to be placed on the Arctic region; statements from well-placed sources have agreed that 'the Arctic will only become more strategically important ... and that the region is … the front line for strategic competition'. (10) NATO countries have also agreed that 'Arctic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities' need to be expanded. (11)

In conclusion, it is, therefore, important to note: the Prime Minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielson, recently stated, following a round of high-level diplomatic talks with the US, that ‘one thing must be clear to everyone. Greenland does not want to be owned by the US. Greenland does not want to be governed by the US. Greenland does not want to be part of the US'. (12)

The people of Greenland have already chosen to remain under the security umbrella provided by Denmark and NATO countries and sovereignty of their natural resources, despite threats from the Trump administration.

It is also important to note that the US remains highly unpopular in Greenland. In March, last year, for example, vice-president JD Vance, visited the country. He was met with organised protests from a large section of the country's tiny population and only visited the US military facilities. It was subsequently noted that his visit was, 'uninvited … and he … did not mingle with local residents'. (13) No official response was given by the White House.

The people of Greenland should be applauded for their courageous anti-imperialist position toward the Trump administration and the US!

1. NATO trio back guard mission for Greenland, Australian, 13 January 2026.
2. Wikipedia: Pituffik Space Base.
3. Ibid.
4. See: The Clandestine Mentality. The CIA and the cult of intelligence, Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, Part 3, Chapter 8, pp. 273-320.
5. See: 'We have very strong military options', Australian, 13 January 2026; and, 'Blackouts undermined by 'tech partisans', Australian, 16 January 2026, which has information about the Pentagon using Space X Starlink internet terminals in an attempt to retain effective contact inside global troublespots.
6. Australian, op.cit., 13 January 2026.
7. Under Trump's icy glare, Australian, 16 January 2026.
8. The expanding footprint of China in the Arctic region, The Explainer, 22 June 2025; and, NATO's Europe: Commander sees growing Russia, Chinese threat in Arctic, Europe: Defence News, 13 January 2026.
9. Greenland to pick Denmark over US takeover, Australian, 15 January 2026.
10. Europe: Defence News, op.cit., 13 January 2026.
11. Ibid.
12. Australian, op.cit., 15 January 2026.
13. Ibid.